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ABSTRACT 
 
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that a Web site operator loses the immunity granted by section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act by materially contributing 
to the alleged illegality of its third-party content. Subsequent case law 
seems to reflect two different standards for determining when this 
“underlying illegality” test is satisfied. Most courts have adopted a 
narrow reading of Roommates.com, denying immunity only when a 
Web site has explicitly requested illegal content. In NPS LLC v. 
StubHub, Inc., however, a Massachusetts district court appears to 
adopt a broader inducement-based standard that would impose 
liability upon a much wider range of conduct. This Article examines 
the recent case law in order to identify the contours of these differing 
theories for negating § 230 immunity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)1 protects 
Web site operators from suits arising out of third-party content as long 
as the operators are not partly responsible for the development of that 
content.2 In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com,3 the Ninth Circuit interpreted this to mean that a Web site 
operator loses § 230 immunity when it materially contributes to the 
underlying illegality of its third-party content.4 
Subsequent case law, however, has not been entirely consistent in 
its application of the “underlying illegality” test. Most cases seem to 
indicate that the test is satisfied only when a defendant explicitly 
requests the illegal material, a scenario found in FTC v. Accusearch 
Inc.,5 but the recent decision in NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc.6 suggests that 
a wider range of conduct generates liability. These divergent 
                                                                                                             
1 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
2 See generally 4 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 
14:11 (4th ed. 2010). 
3 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
4 Id. at 1168. 
5 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 
6 NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009). 
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approaches raise the possibility that two distinct standards have 
emerged in the wake of Roommates.com: “solicitation,” which requires 
an actual request by the Web site operator, and “inducement,” for 
which implicit suggestions may be sufficient.7  
This Article will first provide a brief overview of § 230 and the 
early cases interpreting the provision. Next, the Article will describe 
the “underlying illegality” limitation of Roommates.com and analyze the 
recent case law that applies it. The Article will conclude by examining 
the relationship between the solicitation and inducement approaches 
and by discussing how they might affect future litigants. 
 
I. BASIC OPERATION OF SECTION 230 
 
The purpose behind section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA)8 was to both promote the free exchange of ideas over the 
Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or 
obscene material.9 The statute accomplishes these goals by ensuring 
that those who merely provide an outlet or forum for third-party 
speech over the Internet will not be held liable for any claims that may 
arise out of the content of that speech.10  
In determining whether a defendant is entitled to immunity under 
§ 230(c)(1), courts engage in a three-part analysis.11 First, to receive 
immunity, the defendant must be a “provider or user of an interactive 
computer service,”12 which includes Web sites.13 Next, the cause of 
                                                                                                             
7 For purposes of this Article, the words “solicitation” and “inducement” are 
given specific meanings. These are not terms of art however; they are used here 
merely as conventions. Cases applying Roommates.com have not explicitly defined 
either term, nor have they drawn any clear distinction between the two. Indeed, 
some courts appear to use the terms interchangeably. 
8 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
9 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). 
10 Section 230(c)(1) declares that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” 
11 See, e.g. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418-22 (1st 
Cir. 2007). 
12 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
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action must be one that treats the defendant as the “publisher” or 
“speaker” of the content at issue.14 Claims that would hold the 
defendant liable in some other capacity are unaffected by § 230.15 
Finally, the defendant will not be entitled to immunity  if “responsible, 
in whole or in part, for the creation or development”16 of the content 
because the scope of § 230 extends only to third-party content. The 
bulk of § 230 litigation concerns this third prong,17 but it appears that 
recent cases have adopted differing approaches for determining 
whether the defendant is a “content provider” under the Room-
mates.com framework. 
 
II. THE PRE-ROOMMATES.COM UNDERSTANDING OF “CONTENT 
PROVIDER” 
 
Before Roommates.com, a Web site operator could engage in a wide 
range of actions without being considered a “content provider.” Early 
precedent established that immunity encompassed all “traditional 
editorial functions,” including minor editing of spelling, grammar, and 
length, as well as selecting which content to publish. 18 A Web site 
operator would only face liability if it were to significantly alter the 
meaning of the content. 19 Immunity also remained intact when the 
                                                                                                             
13 The Internet itself qualifies as an “interactive computer service,” and 
therefore, a defendant need only be a “user” of the Internet to satisfy the first prong 
of the test. Because every Web site operator is necessarily an Internet user, this 
requirement is rarely the subject of litigation. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 
1030-31 (9th Cir. 2003). 
14 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
15 For example, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), the 
Ninth Circuit held that § 230 does not insulate a defendant against promissory 
estoppel claims because liability under such claims is based on the defendant’s act of 
making a promise, rather than its role as a publisher. 
16 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2006) (defining “information content provider”). 
17 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 373, 454-55 (2010). 
18 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). See also 
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. 
19 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. 
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Web site operator provided neutral tools for third parties to use in 
creating their own content.20 Such tools included detailed question-
naires with pre-populated drop-down menus that allowed users to 
create online profiles.21 These early developments reflected the notion 
that § 230 conferred a “broad grant of immunity” on Web site 
operators.22 
 
III. ROOMMATES.COM AND THE “UNDERLYING ILLEGALITY” TEST 
 
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com is one 
of the first decisions to place substantive limits on § 230 immunity.23  
The defendant in Roommates.com provided an online community  
where prospective renters and those with available housing could 
connect with one another by searching user profiles and sending or 
receiving email notifications.24 The profiles required users to disclose 
their race, gender, sexual orientation, and whether or not they had 
children, as well as their preferences for these same categories, all of 
which are protected characteristics under the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA).25 The Web site then allowed users to conduct searches based 
on these illegal criteria.26 The Ninth Circuit denied § 230 protection 
because the defendant had “developed” the content on users’ profiles 
and the discriminatory results of their searches.27  
In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted what has been 
                                                                                                             
20 See, e.g. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).  
21 See Id. at 1124. In concluding that these questionnaires did not render the 
defendant a content provider of its users’ profiles, the court explained that “[n]o 
profile has any content until a user actively creates it.” 
22 See Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2008 WL 472433, at *14 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 
19, 2008). 
23 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
24 Id. at 1161-62. 
25 Id. at 1161. The Fair Housing Act generally makes it illegal to express any 
preferences regarding a protected characteristic in the context of the sale or rental of 
a dwelling. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).  
26 Id. at 1167. 
27 Id. at 1166-67. 
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called the “underlying illegality”28 test: “[A] website helps to develop 
unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if 
it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”29 The 
court explained that a Web site that merely provides the tools used to 
create content nevertheless “materially contributes” to its illegality if 
the tools themselves are designed to elicit or encourage its illegal 
nature.30 Such tools effectively lose their “neutral” character and the 
Web site operator is rendered a co-developer of the third-party content 
resulting from their use. Rather than treating § 230 as a “broad grant 
of immunity,” the holding in Roommates.com reinforces its limits by 
establishing the boundary between providing “neutral tools” and being 
actively involved in the development of a third party’s illegal speech.  
However, while the underlying illegality test recognizes that a Web 
site operator can be liable for any content it effectively causes a third 
party to produce, it is unclear what types of actions will exert this 
causal force. The uncertainty owes in large part to the vague and 
varying articulations of the standard found throughout the Room-
mates.com opinion.31 Some language suggests that a Web site loses 
immunity by simply encouraging an illegal aspect of its user-generated 
                                                                                                             
28 This Article uses the term “underlying illegality” when referring to the 
standard set forth in Roommates.com. See Lynn C. Percival, IV, The One-Sided 
Voidability of Contracts Impacted by 47 U.S.C. § 230, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1542423 (adopting this terminology). Other names have been suggested. See, e.g. 
Bradford J. Sayler, Amplifying Illegality: Using the Exception to CDA Immunity Carved 
Out By Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com to Combat 
Abusive Editing Tactics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203 (2009) (the “amplifying illegality” 
concept). 
29 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168. 
30 Id. at 1172. 
31 See Eric Goldman, Roommates.com Denied 230 Immunity by Ninth Circuit En 
Banc (With My Comments), TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING BLOG (April 3, 2008, 8:05 
PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm 
(discussing potential consequences of the opinion’s “myriad of ambiguities”). 
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content.32 In other parts of the opinion, however, the court stresses 
that the users who registered with Roommates.com were literally given 
no choice but to express discriminatory preferences.33 Adding to the 
confusion is the spectrum of terms the court uses, variously describing 
content providers as those who “encourage,” “solicit,” “elicit,” 
“induce,” “urge,” “prompt,” or “promote” unlawful speech. As might 
be expected, decisions following Roommates.com have not applied the 
underlying illegality test consistently. Instead, the case law seems to 
reflect two different approaches to defining culpable behavior: one 
based on “solicitation” and the other on “inducement.” 
 
IV. THE SOLICITATION APPROACH 
 
In a number of recent cases, courts appear to adopt what might be 
termed a “solicitation standard” for evaluating whether a defendant 
has materially contributed to the illegality of its third-party content.34 
                                                                                                             
32 See, e.g., Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167 (“Roommate’s search function is 
similarly designed to steer users based on discriminatory criteria.”); Id. at 1172 (“The 
salient fact in Carafano was that the website’s classifications of user characteristics did 
absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the messages, to encourage 
defamation or to make defamation easier.”). 
33 See, e.g., Id. at 1166, n.19 (“Roommate, of course, does much more than 
encourage or solicit; it forces users to answer certain questions and thereby provide 
information that other clients can use to discriminate unlawfully.”); Id. at 1170, n.26 
(“But, it is Roommate that forces users to express a preference and Roommate that 
forces users to disclose the information that can form the basis of discrimination by 
others.”). 
34 The emergence of a solicitation standard is evidenced by the many cases 
interpreting the Roommates.com opinion narrowly and declining to extend its holding 
to other fact patterns. The most critical factor, according to these cases, is that 
Roommates.com required its users to provide discriminatory responses as a condition 
of using the Web site. See, e.g. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 
591 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Whereas the website in Roommates.com required 
users to input illegal content as a necessary condition of use, Nemet has merely 
alleged that Consumeraffairs.com structured its website and its business operations 
to develop information related to class-action lawsuits.”). Many decisions also point 
out that the questions themselves were discriminatory. See, e.g. Atl. Recording Corp. 
v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision was based solely on the fact that the content on the website that 
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This “solicitation” only occurs when the Web site operator explicitly 
requests the content directly from the third party. Because the stan-
dard is premised on a narrow reading the Roommates.com opinion, a 
defendant whose conduct rises to this level is likely to lose immunity 
regardless of which standard is used. 
 
A.  Key Considerations Under a Solicitation Standard 
 
The solicitation approach appears to have three defining charac-
teristics. To be considered a “developer” of the offending content, a 
Web site operator must make an explicit request for that content, the 
request must be specific enough to exclude lawful material, and there 
must be an illegal motive behind the request. A Web site operator that 
solicits content in this manner is effectively expressing its own ideas by 
enlisting a third party to supply the necessary material.  
First, under a solicitation standard, a defendant’s actions would 
need to rise to the level of an actual request; a Web site operator will 
not lose immunity over material submitted in response to an implicit 
suggestion. In Best Western International, Inc. v. Furber,35 visitors to the 
defendant’s Web site wrote allegedly defamatory emails which the 
defendant then posted online. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the 
Web site “impliedly suggest[ed]” that visitors should make defamatory 
statements, but the court flatly rejected this as a basis for denying 
immunity.36 Instead, the court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant because the Web site did not “explicitly solicit tortious 
material.”37  
In addition to being explicit, a request must exhibit a certain 
degree of specificity to constitute a material contribution under the 
solicitation approach. Among courts that have taken this solicitation 
                                                                                                             
was discriminatory was supplied by Roommates.com itself.”). See also Doe II v. 
MySpace, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishing 
Roommates.com by pointing out that MySpace’s profile questions were not 
discriminatory and that MySpace did not require its members to answer them as a 
condition of using the site).  
35 Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Furber, 2008 WL 4182827 (D. Ariz. Sep. 5, 2008). 
36 Id. at *10 
37 Id. at *10 
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approach, immunity appears to be forfeited only when compliance 
with the request almost necessarily entails providing unlawful content.38 
The case law suggests two basic scenarios that would satisfy this 
condition. In the first scenario, a Web site operator offers a range of 
illegal content options and requires a third party to select from it. 39 
The most frequently cited example of this scenario is the questionnaire 
in Roommates.com, which required users to select discriminatory 
answers from pre-populated drop-down menus. In the second scenario, 
a Web site operator requests a specific kind of information that is 
alleged to have illegal attributes. In Woodhull v. Meinel,40 for example, 
the defendant asked a student-run newspaper for any information it 
had about the plaintiff that she “disliked.” The plaintiff sued, claiming 
that the information provided was defamatory. Though the request 
itself would not seem to require an illegal response, the only content 
that fit its description had an illegal quality. In such cases, it may be 
difficult to determine whether the defendant solicited the content for 
its legal properties or for its illegal properties.  
Finally, as courts often conduct an inquiry into the motivation 
behind the request, liability under a solicitation standard appears to 
require an illegal intent.41 This intent might be inferred from the 
                                                                                                             
38 See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(“The phrase ‘adult,’ even in conjunction with ‘services,’ is not unlawful it itself nor 
does it necessarily call for unlawful content.”). See also Joyner v. Lazzareschi, 2009 
WL 695539, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. March 18, 2009) (finding that a defendant who 
created titles for discussion threads on a message board did not “develop” any 
defamatory postings because “[p]resumably, positive messages about plaintiff or 
messages defending him could be and were posted under the foregoing, general 
thread headings.”).  
39 Examples of cases referencing this type of scenario include Atlantic Recording 
Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), Dart v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009), Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 
1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
40 Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
41 For a discussion of this intentionality requirement in the FTC v. Accusearch 
Inc. trial court opinion, see Recent Cases, Federal District Court Denies § 230 Immunity 
to Website that Solicits Illicit Content: FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 121 HARV. L. REV. 2246 
(2008). The author proposes a mens rea-based exception to CDA immunity. 
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nature of the defendant’s operations or from the manner in which the 
defendant uses the content.42 In Woodhull, the court found it relevant 
that the stated purpose of the defendant’s Web site was “to make fun 
of” the plaintiff, suggesting that the information had been solicited for 
its defamatory character.43 Such inferences connect the defendant’s 
actions to the illicit nature of the content, the key element introduced 
by Roommates.com. 
 
B.  A Possible Example from the Tenth Circuit: FTC v. Accusearch 
 
A recent case out of the Tenth Circuit provides an example of how 
a defendant might lose immunity under a solicitation-based approach. 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch Inc.,44 the defendant sold 
private telephone records through its Web site, Abika.com.45 After a 
customer placed an order, Accusearch would hire third-party 
researchers to locate the information and would post the results to the 
customer’s online account in violation of the Telecommunications 
Act.46 Although Accusearch was aware that the records were obtained 
illegally, it claimed immunity under § 230.47 
In an opinion that largely mirrors Roommates.com, the Tenth 
Circuit determined that Accusearch was responsible for the “devel-
opment” of the records that it supplied to customers, rendering it a 
content provider under § 230(f)(3). The court construed the word 
“develop” to mean “the act of drawing something out, making it 
                                                                                                             
42 In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit noted that “Roommate both elicits the 
allegedly illegal content and makes aggressive use of it in conducting its business.” 
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). For further discussion of how the purposes and uses of 
the defendant’s Web site influenced the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see Varty 
Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 
230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563 (2009). 
43 Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126, 129 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
44 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 
45 Id. at 1191-92. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1199. 
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‘visible,’ ‘active,’ or ‘useable’”48 and stated that a service provider is 
“responsible” for the development of offensive content “only if it in 
some way specifically encourages development of what is offensive 
about the content.”49 According to the court, Accusearch did exactly 
that when it exposed the confidential telephone records to public view 
on Abika.com.50 Even though the content itself was provided by third-
party researchers, Accusearch could not claim § 230 immunity. 
Two aspects of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis are particularly 
significant. First, the court distinguishes its earlier decision in Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc.,51 where a publicly traded 
corporation sued America Online for posting inaccurate information 
about its stock, information that America Online had purchased from 
a third-party vendor. The court points out that the offending content 
in Ben Ezra had been “erroneous stock quotations and, unsurprisingly, 
America Online did not solicit the errors.”52 The critical factor in 
Accusearch thus appears to be the defendant’s solicitation of the 
confidential telephone records. Second, the court asserts that 
“Accusearch’s responsibility is more pronounced than that of Room-
mates.com. Roommates.com may have encouraged users to post 
offending content; but the offensive postings were Accusearch's raison 
d'etre and it affirmatively solicited them.”53 Thus, the Accusearch court 
believed it was applying the underlying illegality test more narrowly 
than the Ninth Circuit did in Roommates.com. Its characterization of 
the Roommates.com scenario focused on the fact that the defendant’s 
conduct in that case represents the minimum level of “development” 
that will remove § 230 immunity. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
48 Id. at 1198. 
49 Id. at 1199. 
50 Id. 
51 Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
52 Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199. 
53 Id. at 1200. 
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V. THE INDUCEMENT APPROACH 
 
Most of the § 230 cases decided since Roommates.com seem to fit 
within the general framework of a solicitation-based standard. At least 
one case, however, has taken a markedly different approach. In NPS 
LLC v. StubHub, Inc.,54 a Massachusetts district court applied a much 
broader interpretation of Roommates.com that would deny immunity to 
those whose actions appear to have “induced” the creation or 
development of illegal content. This “inducement” does not require an 
actual request and can occur even when third parties retain unfettered 
discretion over the nature of the content. Though the exact contours 
of the theory are far from clear, liability under an inducement standard 
is based on a vague determination that the defendant’s actions 
influenced a third party’s decision to post illegal content.55 
 
A.  Evidence of a Broader Interpretation: NPS v. StubHub 
 
In NPS v. StubHub, the New England Patriots brought suit against 
StubHub alleging tortious interference with its contractual 
relationships with season ticket holders.56 StubHub operated a Web 
site that allowed users to buy and sell tickets to sporting, concert, 
theater, and other live entertainment events.57 Although Patriots 
tickets were non-transferrable and the organization prohibited unau-
thorized exchanges, many ticket holders chose to sell their tickets 
through the defendant’s Web site, often at prices greatly exceeding face 
value.58 StubHub did not buy or sell tickets directly but it did profit 
from the transactions, charging a 15% commission to the seller and 
10% to the buyer.59  
                                                                                                             
54 NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009). 
55 See, e.g. Zac Locke, Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites That 
Distribute Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151 (2008) 
(discussing how the Grokster inducement test might be applied in § 230 cases). 
56 NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483 at *4. 
57 Id. at *2. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
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StubHub also facilitated these ticket sales in a number of ways. For 
instance, it offered a limited guarantee against voided tickets.60 It also 
created a special category of sellers, called “LargeSellers,” for those who 
purchased large quantities of tickets and later resold them at a profit.61 
StubHub allowed these users to purchase tickets without the normal 
10% fee and also urged them to “check the website from time to time 
for underpriced tickets or exclusive listings that may not be seen 
elsewhere.”62 StubHub even allowed these users to “mask” the ticket 
location by listing a seat up to five rows away, making it impossible for 
the Patriots to determine, based solely on the listings, which ticket 
holders were selling their tickets.63  
The effect of these measures was to increase the asking price for 
each ticket, resulting in larger commissions.64 By taking advantage of 
these features, however, LargeSellers almost invariably ran afoul of a 
Massachusetts anti-scalping law, which generally forbade the reselling 
of tickets at above face value.65 Hence, listings with inflated ticket 
prices constituted illegal third-party content, which, according to the 
Patriots, satisfied the “improper means” element of its tortious 
interference claim.66 StubHub countered with a § 230 defense.67 
Applying the rule from Roommates.com without discussion, the 
court states that “the same evidence of knowing participation . . . 
sufficient . . . to establish improper means is also sufficient” to deny 
immunity.68 As stated earlier in the opinion, improper means could be 
shown if StubHub either intentionally induced or encouraged others 
to violate the anti-scalping law, or profited from such violations while 
declining to stop or limit them,69 a direct reference to the Grokster70 
                                                                                                             
60 Id.  
61 Id. at *3. 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at *11. 
65 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§185A, 185D (West 2002). 
66 NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *10 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 
2009). 
67 Id. at *12. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at *10. 
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standards for contributory infringement71 and vicarious infringement, 
respectively. 
According to the court, StubHub “intentionally induced or encou-
raged” LargeSellers to violate the anti-scalping law when it “strongly 
urged” them to check the Web site for underpriced tickets and offered 
to waive the 10% fee.72 By virtue of its commission system, StubHub 
also profited when tickets were sold for more than face value, and it 
declined to stop or limit this activity because it did not require sellers 
to list the face value of the ticket, making it impossible to know 
whether the law was being violated.73  
These actions were enough to take StubHub outside the scope of § 
230. Because the opinion itself only purports to decide the immunity 
issue based on the “same evidence,” and not necessarily the same 
standard, as the improper means issue, one cannot conclusively say 
that Grokster is responsible for the result. Based on the facts alone, 
however, the court’s interpretation of the underlying illegality test is a 
clear departure from the prior narrow interpretations of Room-
mates.com. 
While the StubHub decision itself may not carry much precedential 
weight, it could be a preview of how the underlying illegality test will 
be applied by courts eager to establish limits on § 230 immunity.74 The 
                                                                                                             
70 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
71 “[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” 
Id. at 936-937. For a discussion on the impact such a standard would have on § 230 
jurisprudence, see Varty Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563 
(2009). 
72 NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *11 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 
2009). 
73 Id. at *11. It is worth noting that StubHub displayed the text of the 
Massachusetts anti-scalping law on its “Q & A” page. See Id. at *2. 
74 An inducement-based approach appears in another case as well, though not as 
an interpretation of the Roommates.com exception. In People v. Gourlay, 2009 WL 
529216 (Mich. Ct. App. March 3, 2009), a criminal defendant was convicted for his 
role in providing Web hosting services as well as “artistic assistance” to a minor who 
had created a Web site to broadcast pornographic images of himself over the 
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Seventh Circuit in particular has shown some hostility toward 
expansive readings of the statute and its decision in Chicago Lawyers’ 
Committee v. Craigslist75 even indicates that Grokster would apply in the 
context of § 230 as well.76 The inducement standard would represent a 
natural extension of this theory. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit itself 
is gaining a reputation for its willingness to deny § 230 protection. If 
called upon to clarify its holding in Roommates.com, the court may be 
inclined to follow an inducement-based approach. 
 
B.  Distinguishing Inducement from Solicitation 
 
As is readily apparent from the StubHub case, inducement differs 
from solicitation in at least two important respects: it requires no 
explicit request and can occur even when users have been given the 
option of posting legal content.  
First, a Web site operator can be liable under an inducement 
standard without making any explicit statements or requests. StubHub 
never requested that its users increase the price of the tickets they sold; 
indeed, the Web site’s user agreement expressly required sellers to 
comply with all applicable laws when setting their prices.77 The second 
key difference is that, under inducement, a Web site operator can still 
be considered a “developer” of user-generated content even if users 
have the option of posting legal content. In StubHub, the Web site had 
                                                                                                             
Internet. The defendant appealed, arguing that 47 U.S.C. § 230 preempted his 
conviction because he had not created or developed the pornographic content. In 
dismissing this claim, the court noted that the offense required proof that he had 
“persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d], coerce[d], cause[d], or knowingly allowe[d]” a child 
to engage in a sexually abusive activity. Id. at *4. Because of this, the court concluded, 
a defendant who has committed the offense has necessarily placed himself outside 
the scope of § 230 immunity. Id. at *5. Though based on a Michigan criminal statute, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.145c(2) (West 2004), the analysis in Gourlay would 
seem to permit a loss of immunity even in cases of “persuasion,” a far cry from the 
rigorous requirements of the solicitation theory.  
75 Chicago Lawyer’s Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). 
76 Id. at 670. 
77 NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *11 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 
2009). 
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“developed” the illegal ticket prices even though its users remained 
entirely free to engage in legitimate ticket sales.  
These two features demonstrate the relatively tenuous causal 
relationship capable of triggering liability under an inducement stan-
dard. Because of these differences, the inducement standard carves out 
a much larger exception to the protections available under § 230. 
 
C.  Key Considerations Under an Inducement Standard 
 
When evaluating claims under an inducement standard, a court 
might focus on the specific actions of a defendant, the intent behind 
those actions, and the influence they exert on a third-party’s decision 
to produce illegal content. There must some cognizable act by the 
defendant to support a denial of immunity, but this act need not be an 
actual request for unlawful content. 78 A plaintiff would also need to 
demonstrate that the act was driven by an illegal intent.79 This intent 
can be inferred from context, particularly when a Web site’s revenue 
depends on the particular choices that its users make. 80 
Perhaps most importantly, the defendant’s actions must in some 
way influence a third party’s decision to develop content that is 
unlawful. Although the discussion in StubHub offers little guidance on 
this point, the facts of the case help to identify three categories of 
behavior that may be problematic. The first involves creating financial 
incentives for others to produce illegal material,81 such as the special 
                                                                                                             
78 See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 421 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (“Even assuming arguendo that active inducement could negate Section 
230 immunity, it is clear that UCS has not alleged any acts by Lycos that come even 
close to constituting the ‘clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster’ 
unlawful activity that would be necessary to find active inducement.”) (citing Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 914 (2005)). 
79 People v. Gourlay, 2009 WL 529216, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. March 3, 2009) 
(“[W]hen a person persuades, induces, entices, or coerces another, the person is 
actively and intentionally attempting to bring about a particular action or result.”).  
80 Hattie Harman, Drop-Down Lists and the Communication Decency Act: A Creation 
Conundrum, 43 IND. L. REV. 143, 172-173 (2009). 
81
 See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(“Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing 
or express a preference for discrimination; for example, craigslist does not offer a 
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discount given to LargeSellers in StubHub. Another category involves 
reducing the risk of detection for users who commit illegal acts. 
Although not specifically mentioned in the court’s analysis, the ability 
of StubHub users to “mask” the location of their seats would fall under 
this category. Other examples may include guarantees of anonymity 
offered by “repu-taint” Web sites.82 A third category covers instances 
where a Web site operator provides suggestions or examples of illegal 
content for its users to emulate,83 although it is unclear whether this 
alone could sufficiently influence a user’s behavior. StubHub may offer 
an example from this category as well, as the court found it significant 
that the defendant had “strongly urged” LargeSellers to check the 
listings for underpriced tickets. Beyond these general observations, 
however, the contours of an inducement standard remain unclear. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Cases decided in the wake of Roomates.com seem to reflect two 
different standards for determining when the “underlying illegality” 
test is satisfied. Most courts apply a “solicitation” standard, requiring 
the Web site operator to explicitly request the offending material. This 
request must be specific enough that compliance with its terms would 
almost necessarily entail providing illegal content. An “inducement” 
standard, on the other hand, could deprive a Web site operator of 
immunity even when its users retain a significant degree of control 
over the illicit nature of the posted content. Inducement describes 
conduct that influences a third party’s decision to develop illegal 
material, either by creating financial incentives, reducing the risk of 
detection, or perhaps offering examples for third parties to emulate. 
Liability will not attach under either standard however, unless the 
                                                                                                             
lower price to people who include discriminatory statements in their postings.”) 
(citing Chicago Lawyer’s Comm. For Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
82 See Patricia Sánchez Abril , Repu-Taint Sites and the Limits of § 230 Immunity, J. 
INTERNET L., Jan. 2009, at 3 (explaining that a “repu-taint” Web site is one that 
encourages users to post sensitive information about others without regard for the 
disclosure’s veracity or consequences.).  
83 Id. 
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defendant harbored an illegal intent, which often must be inferred 
from context. Despite indications that some courts might be willing to 
adopt a broader interpretation of Roommates.com, the weight of 
authority continues to support strong protections for Web site 
operators. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Regardless of how broadly a court may interpret the Roommates.com 
exception, a plaintiff will still need to establish that the Web site 
operator intended for its users to produce unlawful content and 
that it took specific action to bring about that result. 
 Under a narrower “solicitation” standard, defendants will generally 
be entitled to § 230 immunity unless their actions amount to an 
explicit request that is specifically limited to illegal material. 
 Under a broader “inducement”-type standard, a plaintiff may be 
able to overcome a § 230 defense by merely showing that the 
defendant’s actions in some way influenced a third party’s decision 
to produce illegal content. 
 To reduce exposure, Web site operators should examine their fee 
structures or pricing policies to ensure that they do not create 
financial incentives for unlawful behavior. Any sample content or 
recommendations to users should be removed if they might tend 
to suggest an illegal course of action. 
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